LIFE IN THE ROMAN WORLD OF NERO AND ST. PAUL
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EXTENT AND SECURITY OF THE EMPIRE
The best means of realising the extent of the Roman Empire in or about
the year 64 is to glance at the map. It will be found to reach from
the Atlantic Ocean to the Euphrates, from the middle of
England--approximately the river Trent--to the south of Egypt, from
the Rhine and the Danube to the Desert of Sahara. The Mediterranean
Sea is a Roman lake, and there is not a spot upon its shores which is
not under Roman rule. In round numbers the empire is three thousand
miles in length and two thousand in breadth. Its population, which, at
least in the western parts, was much thinner then than it is over the
same area at present, cannot be calculated with any accuracy, but an
estimate of one hundred millions would perhaps be not very far from
the mark.
Beyond its borders--sometimes too dangerously near to them and apt to
overstep them--lay various peoples concerning whom Roman knowledge was
for the most part incomplete and indefinite. Within its own boundaries
the Roman government carefully collected every kind of information.
Such precision was indispensable for the carrying out of those Roman
principles of administration which will be described later. But of the
nations or tribes beyond the frontiers only so much was known as had
been gathered from a number of more or less futile campaigns, from
occasional embassies sent to Rome by such peoples, from the writings
of a few venturous travellers bent on exploration, from slaves who had
been acquired by war or purchase, or from traders such as those who
made their way to the Baltic in quest of amber, or to Arabia,
Ethiopia, and India in quest of precious metals, jewels, ivory,
perfumes, and fabrics.
There had indeed been sundry attempts to annex still more of the
world. Roman armies had crossed the Rhine and had twice fought their
way to the Elbe; but it became apparent to the shrewd Augustus and
Tiberius that the country could not be held, and the Rhine was for the
present accepted as the most natural and practical frontier. In the
East the attempts permanently to annex Armenia, or a portion of
Parthia, had so far proved but nominal or almost entirely vain.
On the Upper Euphrates at this date there was a sort of acknowledgment
of vague dependence on Rome, but the empire had acquired nothing more
solid. Forty years before our date a Roman expedition had penetrated
into South-west Arabia, of which the wealth was extravagantly
over-estimated, but it had met with complete failure. Into Ethiopia a
punitive campaign had been made against Queen Candace, and a loose
suzerainty was claimed over her kingdom, but the Roman frontier still
stopped short at Elephantine. Over the territories of the semi-Greek
semi-Scythian settlements to the north of the Black Sea Rome exercised
a protectorate, which was for obvious reasons not unwelcome to those
concerned. Along or near the eastern frontier she well understood the
policy of the "buffer state," and, within her own borders in those
parts, was ready to make tools of petty kings, whose own ambitions
would both assist her against external foes and relieve her of
administrative trouble.
At no time did the Roman Empire possess so natural or scientific a
frontier as at this, when it was bounded by the Rhine, the Danube, the
Black Sea, the Euphrates, the Desert, and the Atlantic. The only
exception, it will be perceived, was in Britain, but the Roman idea
there also was to annex the whole island, a feat which was never
accomplished. Two generations after our chosen date Rome had conquered
as far as the Firths of Clyde and Forth; it had crossed the Southern
Rhine, and annexed the south-west corner of Germany, approximately
from Cologne to Ratisbon; it had passed the Danube, and secured and
settled Dacia, which is roughly the modern Roumania; and it had pushed
its power somewhat further into the East. But it had not thereby
increased either its strength or its stability.
At the period then with which we are to deal, the Roman Empire
included the countries now known as Holland, Belgium, France, Spain
and Portugal, Switzerland, Italy, the southern half of the Austrian
Empire, Greece, Turkey, Asia Minor, Syria and Palestine, Egypt,
Tripoli and Tunis, Algeria, Morocco, and also the southern two-thirds
of England. Within these borders there prevailed that greatest
blessing of the Roman rule, the pax Romana, or "Roman peace."
Whatever defects may be found in the Roman administration, on whatever
abstract grounds the existence of such an empire may be impugned, it
cannot be questioned that for at least two centuries the whole of this
vast region enjoyed a general reign of peace and security such as it
never knew before and has never known since. That peace meant also
social and industrial prosperity and development. It meant an immense
increase in settled population and in manufactures, and an immense
advance--particularly in the West--in civilised manners and
intellectual interests.
Peoples and tribes which had been at perpetual war among themselves or
with some neighbour were reduced to quietude. Communities which had
been liable to sudden invasion and to all manner of arbitrary changes
in their conditions of life, in their burdens of taxation, and even in
their personal freedom, now knew exactly where they stood, and, for
the most part, perceived that they stood in a much more tolerable and
a distinctly more assured position than before. If there must
sometimes be it would be the Roman tyrant, and he, as we shall find,
affected them but little. All irresponsible local tyrannies, whether
of kings or parties, were abolished.
On the high seas within the empire you might voyage with no fear
whatever of pirates. If you looked for pirates you must look beyond
the Roman sphere to the Indian Ocean. There might also be a few to be
found in the Black Sea. On the high road you might travel from
Jerusalem to Rome, and from Rome to Cologne or Cadiz, with no fear of
any enemy except such banditti and footpads as the central or local
government could not always manage to put down. On the whole there was
nearly everywhere a clear recognition of the advantages conferred by
the empire.
It is quite true that during these two centuries we meet with frequent
trouble on the borders and with one or two local revolts of more or
less strength. At our chosen date the Jews were being stirred by their
fanatical or "zealot" party into an almost hopeless insurrection;
within two years the rebellion broke out. Three years later still,
certain ambitious semi-Romans took advantage of a troubled time to
make a determined but futile effort to form a Gaulish or
German-Gaulish empire of their own. Half a century after Nero the Jews
once again rose, but were speedily suppressed. But apart from these
abortive efforts--made, one by a unique form of religious zeal, one by
adventurous ambition, at opposite extremities of the Roman
world--there was established a general, and in most cases a willing,
acceptance of the situation and a proper recognition of its benefits.
The only serious war to be feared within the empire itself was a civil
war, begun by some aspiring leader when his chance seemed strong of
ousting the existing emperor or of succeeding to his throne. Four
years from the date at which we have placed ourselves such a war
actually did break out. Nero was driven from the throne in favour of
Galba, and the history of the year following is the history of Otho
murdering Galba, Vitellius overthrowing Otho, and Vespasian in his
turn overthrowing Vitellius. Yet all this is but the story of one
entirely exceptional year, the famous "year of four emperors." Take
out that year from the imperial history; count a hundred years before
and more than a hundred years after, and it would be impossible to
find in the history of the world any period at which peace, and
probably contentment, was so widely and continuously spread. Think of
all the countries which have just been enumerated as lying within the
Roman border; then imagine that, with the exception of one year of
general commotion, two or three provincial and local revolts, and
occasional irruptions and retaliations upon the frontier, they have
all been free from war and its havoc ever since the year 1700. In our
year of grace 64, although the throne is occupied by a vicious emperor
suffering from megalomania and enormous self-conceit, the empire is in
full enjoyment of its pax Romana.
Another glance at the map will show how secure this internal peace was
felt to be. The Roman armies will be found almost entirely upon the
frontiers. It was, of course, imperative that there should be strong
forces in such positions--in Britain carrying out the annexation; on
the Rhine and Danube defending against huge-bodied, restless Germans
and their congeners; on the Euphrates to keep off the nimble and
dashing Parthian horse and foot; in Upper Egypt to guard against the
raids of "Fuzzy-Wuzzy "; in the interior of Tunis or Algeria to keep
the nomad Berber tribes in hand. In such places were the Roman legions
and their auxiliary troops regularly kept under the eagles, for there
lay their natural work, and there do we find them quartered generation
after generation.
It is, of course, true that they might be employed inwards as well as
outwards; but it must be manifest that, if there had been any
widespread disaffection, any reasonable suspicion that serious revolts
might happen, there would have been many other large bodies of troops
posted in garrison throughout the length and breadth of the provinces.
In point of fact the whole Roman military force can scarcely have
amounted to more than 320,000 men, while the navy consisted of two
small fleets of galleys, one regularly posted at Misenum at the
entrance to the Bay of Naples, the other at Ravenna on the Adriatic.
To these we may add a flotilla of boats operating on the Lower Rhine
and the neighbouring coasts. Except during the year of civil war the
two fleets have practically no history. They enjoyed the advantage of
having almost nothing to fight against. If pirates had become
dangerous--as for a brief time they threatened to do during the Jewish
revolt--the imperial ships would have been in readiness to suppress
them. They could be made useful for carrying despatches and imperial
persons or troops, or they might be used against a seaside town if
necessary. Beyond this they hardly correspond to our modern navies.
There was no foreign competition to build against, and no "two-power
standard" to be maintained.
The Roman troops, it has already been said, were almost wholly on the
frontier. So far as there are exceptions, they explain themselves. It
was found necessary at all times to keep at least one legion regularly
quartered in Northern Spain, where the mountaineers were inclined to
be predatory, and where they were skilful, as they have always been,
at carrying on guerilla warfare. We may, if we choose, regard this
comparatively small army as policing a lawless district. In but few
other places do we find a regular military force. Rome itself had both
a garrison and also a large body of Imperial Guards. The garrison,
consisting of some 6000 men, was in barracks inside the city, and its
purpose was to protect the wealth of the metropolis and the seat of
government from any sudden riot or factious tumult. It must be
remembered that among the Romans it was soldiers who served as police,
whether at Rome or in the provinces. The Imperial Guards, consisting
of 12,000 troops, were stationed just outside the gates, in order to
secure the safety and position of the emperor himself, if any attempt
should be made against his person or authority. The rich and important
town of Lugdunum (or Lyons) had a small garrison of 1200 men, and a
certain number of troops were always to be found in garrison in those
great towns where factious disturbances were either probable or
possible. Thus at Alexandria, where the Jews were fanatical and at
loggerheads with the Greeks, and where the native Egyptians were no
less fanatical and might be at loggerheads with both, it was necessary
to keep a disciplinary force in readiness. Somewhat similar was the
case at Antioch, where the discords of the Greeks, Syrians, and Jews
stood in need of the firm Roman hand. Nor could a similar regiment be
spared from Jerusalem. The western towns were generally smaller in
size, more homogeneous, and more tranquil. It was around the Levant
that the popular émeute was most to be feared. Doubtless one may
meet, whether in the New Testament or in Roman and Greek writers, with
frequent mention of soldiers, and we make acquaintance with an
occasional centurion--something socially above a colour-sergeant and
below a captain--or other officer in various parts of the empire. But
it should be understood that, except in such places as those which
have been named, soldiers were distributed in small handfuls, to act
as gendarmerie, to deal with brigands, to serve as bodyguard and
orderlies to a governor, to bear despatches, to be custodians of state
prisoners. To these classes belong the centurions of the Acts of the
Apostles, while Lysias was the colonel of the regiment keeping order
in Jerusalem.
What the Roman army was like, whence it was recruited, how it was
armed, and what were its operations, are matters to be shown in a
later chapter. Regarded then as a controlling agent, maintaining
widespread peace, the Roman Empire answers closely to the British
raj in India. The analogy could indeed be pressed very much further
and with more closeness of detail, but this is scarcely the place for
such a discussion.
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