The Roman Republic
Free Constitutions and Imperial Tendencies.--Instructiveness of Roman History.--Character of Historical Epochs.--The Age of Caesar.--Spiritual State of Rome.--Contrasts between Ancient and Modern Civilization.
To the student of political history, and to the English student
above all others, the conversion of the Roman Republic into a
military empire commands a peculiar interest. Notwithstanding many
differences, the English and the Romans essentially resemble one
another. The early Romans possessed the faculty of self-government
beyond any people of whom we have historical knowledge, with the
one exception of ourselves. In virtue of their temporal freedom,
they became the most powerful nation in the known world; and their
liberties perished only when Rome became the mistress of conquered
races, to whom she was unable or unwilling to extend her
privileges. If England was similarly supreme, if all rival powers
were eclipsed by her or laid under her feet, the Imperial
tendencies, which are as strongly marked in us as our love of
liberty, might lead us over the same course to the same end. If
there be one lesson which history clearly teaches, it is this, that
free nations cannot govern subject provinces. If they are unable or
unwilling to admit their dependencies to share their own
constitution, the constitution itself will fall in pieces from mere
incompetence for its duties.
We talk often foolishly of the necessities of things, and we
blame circumstances for the consequences of our own follies and
vices; but there are faults which are not faults of will, but
faults of mere inadequacy to some unforeseen position. Human nature
is equal to much, but not to everything. It can rise to altitudes
where it is alike unable to sustain itself or to retire from them
to a safer elevation. Yet when the field is open it pushes forward,
and moderation in the pursuit of greatness is never learnt and
never will be learnt. Men of genius are governed by their instinct;
they follow where instinct leads them; and the public life of a
nation is but the life of successive generations of statesmen,
whose horizon is bounded, and who act from day to day as immediate
interests suggest. The popular leader of the hour sees some present
difficulty or present opportunity of distinction. He deals with
each question as it arises, leaving future consequences to those
who are to come after him. The situation changes from period to
period, and tendencies are generated with an accelerating force,
which, when once established, can never be reversed. When the
control of reason is once removed, the catastrophe is no longer
distant, and then nations, like all organized creations, all forms
of life, from the meanest flower to the highest human institution,
pass through the inevitably recurring stages of growth and
transformation and decay. A commonwealth, says Cicero, ought to be
immortal, and for ever to renew its youth. Yet commonwealths have
proved as unenduring as any other natural object:
Everything that grows
Holds in perfection but a little moment,
And this huge state presenteth nought but shows,
Whereon the stars in silent influence comment.
Nevertheless, "as the heavens are high above the earth, so
is wisdom above folly." Goethe compares life to a game at
whist, where the cards are dealt out by destiny, and the rules of
the game are fixed: subject to these conditions, the players are
left to win or lose, according to their skill or want of skill. The
life of a nation, like the life of a man, may be prolonged in honor
into the fulness of its time, or it may perish prematurely, for
want of guidance, by violence or internal disorders. And thus the
history of national revolutions is to statesmanship what the
pathology of disease is to the art of medicine. The physician
cannot arrest the coming on of age. Where disease has laid hold
upon the constitution he cannot expel it. But he may check the
progress of the evil if he can recognize the symptoms in time. He
can save life at the cost of an unsound limb. He can tell us how to
preserve our health when we have it; he can warn us of the
conditions under which particular disorders will have us at
disadvantage. And so with nations: amidst the endless variety of
circumstances there are constant phenomena which give notice of
approaching danger; there are courses of action which have
uniformly produced the same results; and the wise politicians are
those who have learnt from experience the real tendencies of
things, unmisled by superficial differences, who can shun the rocks
where others have been wrecked, or from foresight of what is coming
can be cool when the peril is upon them.
For these reasons, the fall of the Roman Republic is
exceptionally instructive to us. A constitutional government the
most enduring and the most powerful that ever existed was put on
its trial, and found wanting. We see it in its growth; we see the
causes which undermined its strength. We see attempts to check the
growing mischief fail, and we see why they failed. And we see,
finally, when nothing seemed so likely as complete dissolution, the
whole system changed by a violent operation, and the dying
patient's life protracted for further centuries of power and
usefulness.
Again, irrespective of the direct teaching which we may gather
from them, particular epochs in history have the charm for us which
dramas have-- periods when the great actors on the stage of life
stand before us with the distinctness with which they appear in the
creations of a poet. There have not been many such periods; for to
see the past, it is not enough for us to be able to look at it
through the eyes of contemporaries; these contemporaries themselves
must have been parties to the scenes which they describe. They must
have had full opportunities of knowledge. They must have had eyes
which could see things in their true proportions. They must have
had, in addition, the rare literary powers which can convey to
others through the medium of language an exact picture of their own
minds; and such happy combinations occur but occasionally in
thousands of years. Generation after generation passes by, and is
crumbled into sand as rocks are crumbled by the sea. Each brought
with it its heroes and its villains, its triumphs and its sorrows;
but the history is formless legend, incredible and unintelligible;
the figures of the actors are indistinct as the rude ballad or
ruder inscription, which may be the only authentic record of them.
We do not see the men and women, we see only the outlines of them
which have been woven into tradition as they appeared to the loves
or hatreds of passionate admirers or enemies. Of such times we know
nothing, save the broad results as they are measured from century
to century, with here and there some indestructible pebble, some
law, some fragment of remarkable poetry which has resisted
decomposition. These periods are the proper subject of the
philosophic historian, and to him we leave them. But there are
others, a few, at which intellectual activity was as great as it is
now, with its written records surviving, in which the passions, the
opinions, the ambitions of the age are all before us, where the
actors in the great drama speak their own thoughts in their own
words, where we hear their enemies denounce them and their friends
praise them; where we are ourselves plunged amidst the hopes and
fears of the hour, to feel the conflicting emotions and to
sympathize in the struggles which again seem to live: and here
philosophy is at fault. Philosophy, when we are face to face with
real men, is as powerless as over the Iliad or King Lear. The
overmastering human interest transcends explanation. We do not sit
in judgment on the right or the wrong; we do not seek out causes to
account for what takes place, feeling too conscious of the
inadequacy of our analysis. We see human beings possessed by
different impulses, and working out a pre-ordained result, as the
subtle forces drive each along the path marked out for him; and
history becomes the more impressive to us where it least
immediately instructs.
With such vividness, with such transparent clearness, the age
stands before us of Cato and Pompey, of Cicero and Julius Caesar;
the more distinctly because it was an age in so many ways the
counterpart of our own, the blossoming period of the old
civilization, when the intellect was trained to the highest point
which it could reach, and on the great subjects of human interest,
on morals and politics, on poetry and art, even on religion itself
and the speculative problems of life, men thought as we think,
doubted where we doubt, argued as we argue, aspired and struggled
after the same objects. It was an age of material progress and
material civilization; an age of civil liberty and intellectual
culture; an age of pamphlets and epigrams, of salons and of
dinner-parties, of senatorial majorities and electoral corruption.
The highest offices of state were open in theory to the meanest
citizen; they were confined, in fact, to those who had the longest
purses, or the most ready use of the tongue on popular platforms.
Distinctions of birth had been exchanged for distinctions of
wealth. The struggles between plebeians and patricians for equality
of privilege were over, and a new division had been formed between
the party of property and a party who desired a change in the
structure of society. The free cultivators were disappearing from
the soil. Italy was being absorbed into vast estates, held by a few
favored families and cultivated by slaves, while the old
agricultural population was driven off the land, and was crowded
into towns. The rich were extravagant, for life had ceased to have
practical interest, except for its material pleasures; the
occupation of the higher classes was to obtain money without labor,
and to spend it in idle enjoyment. Patriotism survived on the lips,
but patriotism meant the ascendency of the party which would
maintain the existing order of things, or would overthrow it for a
more equal distribution of the good things which alone were valued.
Religion, once the foundation of the laws and rule of personal
conduct, had subsided into opinion. The educated, in their hearts,
disbelieved it. Temples were still built with increasing splendor;
the established forms were scrupulously observed. Public men spoke
conventionally of Providence, that they might throw on their
opponents the odium of impiety; but of genuine belief that life had
any serious meaning, there was none remaining beyond the circle of
the silent, patient, ignorant multitude. The whole spiritual
atmosphere was saturated with cant--cant moral, cant political,
cant religious; an affectation of high principle which had ceased
to touch the conduct, and flowed on in an increasing volume of
insincere and unreal speech. The truest thinkers were those who,
like Lucretius, spoke frankly out their real convictions, declared
that Providence was a dream, and that man and the world he lived in
were material phenomena, generated by natural forces out of cosmic
atoms, and into atoms to be again resolved.
Tendencies now in operation may a few generations hence land
modern society in similar conclusions, unless other convictions
revive meanwhile and get the mastery of them; of which possibility
no more need be said than this, that unless there be such a revival
in some shape or other, the forces, whatever they be, which control
the forms in which human things adjust themselves, will make an end
again, as they made an end before, of what are called free
institutions. Popular forms of government are possible only when
individual men can govern their own lives on moral principles, and
when duty is of more importance than pleasure, and justice than
material expediency. Rome at any rate had grown ripe for judgment.
The shape which the judgment assumed was due perhaps, in a measure,
to a condition which has no longer a parallel among us. The men and
women by whom the hard work of the world was done were chiefly
slaves, and those who constitute the driving force of revolutions
in modern Europe lay then outside society, unable and perhaps
uncaring to affect its fate. No change then possible would much
influence the prospects of the unhappy bondsmen. The triumph of the
party of the constitution would bring no liberty to them. That
their masters should fall like themselves under the authority of a
higher master could not much distress them. Their sympathies, if
they had any, would go with those nearest their own rank, the
emancipated slaves and the sons of those who were emancipated; and
they, and the poor free citizens everywhere, were to a man on the
side which was considered and was called the side of "the
people," and was, in fact, the side of despotism.
Back - Next
|
|